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Given the description of a game in extensive form, what is the optimal Stackelberg strategy that the leader should commit to?
We study this problem for multiple classes of two-player extensive-form games (EFGs) and variants of the Stackelberg solution concept that differ in kinds of strategies to commit to, and we provide both efficient algorithms and computational hardness results. We emphasize the positive results in the main text of the article and fully state technical hardness results in the appendix.
Our Results
The problem of computing a Stackelberg equilibrium in EFGs can be classified by the following parameters:
• Information. Information captures how much a player knows about the opponent's moves (past and present). We study turn-based games (TB), where for each state there is a unique player that can perform an action, and concurrent-move games (CM), where the players act simultaneously in at least one state.
• Chance. A game with chance nodes allows stochastic transitions between states; otherwise, the transitions are deterministic (made through actions of the players).
• Graph. We focus on trees and directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) as the main representations.
Given such a graph, each node represents a different state in the game, while the edges represent the transitions between states.
• Strategies. We study several major types of strategies that the leader can commit to, namely pure (P), behavioral (B), and correlated behavioral (C).
The results are summarized in Table 1 and can be divided into three categories. 1 First, we design a more efficient algorithm for computing optimal pure strategies to commit to for turn-based games on DAGs. Compared to the previous state of the art (due to Letchford and Conitzer (2010) , (Letchford 2013 )), we reduce the complexity by a factor proportional to the 23:4 B. Bošanský et al. number of terminal states (see row 1 in Table 1 ). The main idea behind the improvement is the exploitation of algorithms for solving the widest-path problem on a DAG from a single source to multiple destinations. Note that the problem of computing mixed behavioral strategies to commit to is shown to be NP-hard due to a reduction from SAT (Letchford 2013) .
Second, we investigate the impact of commitments to correlated strategies. In this setting, the leader can send the follower signals about which action the follower should play, and following these signals must be a best response for the follower. Contrary to behavioral strategies where the best response of the follower is a pure strategy, the leader can randomize among the signals (and thus best responses of the follower). This significantly modifies the space of strategies that can also affect the computational complexity of the problem. Indeed, we show that correlation often reduces the computational complexity of finding optimal strategies, and we design several new polynomial-time algorithms for computing the optimal correlated strategy to commit to for both turn-based and concurrent-move games (see rows 3, 7, 9).
Third, we study approximation algorithms for the NP-hard problems in this framework and provide fully polynomial-time approximation schemes (FPTAS) for finding pure and behavioral Stackelberg equilibria for turn-based games on trees with chance nodes (see rows 5, 6). The hardness proof uses a reduction from Knapsack (Letchford and Conitzer 2010) , and we exploit this connection since our algorithm resembles the classical approximation scheme for Knapsack. We leave open the question of finding an approximation for concurrent-move games on trees without chance nodes for which we have only the negative result (see row 8).
Related Work
There is a rich body of literature studying the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria. The computational complexity of the problem is known for one-shot games (Conitzer and Sandholm 2006) , Bayesian games (Conitzer and Sandholm 2006) , and selected subclasses of extensive-form games (Letchford and Conitzer 2010) and infinite stochastic games (Gupta 2015; Letchford et al. 2012) . Similarly, many practical algorithms are also known and typically based on solving multiple linear programs (Conitzer and Sandholm 2006) , or mixed-integer linear programs for Bayesian (Paruchuri et al. 2008 ) and extensive-form games (Bošanský and Čermák 2015) .
For one-shot games, the problem of computing a Stackelberg equilibrium is polynomial (Conitzer and Sandholm 2006) in contrast to the PPAD-completeness of a Nash equilibrium (Chen et al. 2009; Daskalakis et al. 2006b ). The situation changes in extensive-form games where Letchford and Conitzer showed (2010) that for many cases the problem is NP-hard, while it still remains PPAD-complete for a Nash equilibrium (Daskalakis et al. 2006a ). More specifically, computing Stackelberg equilibria is polynomial only for:
• games with perfect information with no chance on DAGs, where the leader commits to a pure strategy, • games with perfect information with no chance on trees.
Introducing chance or imperfect information leads to NP-hardness. However, several cases were unexplored by the existing work; namely, extensive-form games with perfect information and concurrent moves. We address this subclass in this work.
The computational complexity can also change when the leader commits to correlated strategies. This extension of the Stackelberg notion to correlated strategies appeared in several works (Conitzer and Korzhyk 2011; Letchford et al. 2012; Xu et al. 2015) . Conitzer and Korzhyk (2011) analyzed correlated strategies in one-shot games providing a single linear program for their computation. Letchford et al. (2012) showed that the problem of finding optimal correlated strategies to commit to is NP-hard in infinite discounted stochastic games. 2 Xu et al. (2015) focused on using correlated strategies in a real-world security-based scenario.
The detailed analysis of the impact when the leader can commit to correlated strategies has, however, not been investigated sufficiently in the existing work. We address this extension and study the complexity for multiple subclasses of extensive-form games. Our results show that, for many, cases the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in correlated strategies is polynomial compared to the NP-hardness in behavioral strategies. Finally, these theoretical results have also practical algorithmic implications. An algorithm that computes a Stackelberg equilibrium in correlated strategies can be used to compute a Stackelberg equilibrium in behavioral strategies, allowing a significant speed-up in computation time (Čermák et al. 2016 ).
PRELIMINARIES
We consider finite two-player sequential games. Note that for every finite set K, Δ(K ) denotes probability distributions over K and P (K ) denotes the set of all subsets of K.
Definition 2.1 (2-player sequential game).
A two-player sequential game is given by a tuple G = (N , S, Z, ρ, A, u, T , C), where:
• N = {1, 2} is a set of two players;
• S is a set of nonterminal states;
• Z is a set of terminal states;
• ρ : S → P(N ) ∪ {c} is a function that defines which player(s) act in a given state, or whether the node is a chance node (case in which ρ (s) = c); • A is a set of actions; we overload the notation to restrict the actions only for a single player as A i and for a single state as A (s); • T : S × i ∈ρ (s ) A i → {S ∪ Z} is a transition function between states depending on the actions taken by all the players that act in this state. Overloading notation, T (s) also denotes the children of a state s: T (s) = {s ∈ S ∪ Z | ∃a ∈ A(s); T (s, a) = s }; • C : A c → [0, 1] are the chance probabilities on the edges outgoing from each chance node s ∈ S, such that a ∈A c (s ) C(a) = 1; • Finally, u i : Z → R is the utility function for player i ∈ N .
In this article, we study Stackelberg equilibria; thus, player 1 will be referred to as the leader and player 2 as the follower.
We say that a game is turn-based if there is a unique player acting in each state (formally, |ρ (s)| = 1 ∀s ∈ S) and with concurrent moves if both players can act simultaneously in some state. Moreover, the game is said to have no chance if there exist no chance nodes; otherwise, the game is with chance.
A pure strategy π i ∈ Π i of a player i ∈ N is an assignment of an action to play in each state of the game (π i : S → A i ), and Π i denotes the set of all pure strategies of player i. A behavioral strategy σ i ∈ Σ i is a probability distribution over actions in each state σ i : A → [0, 1] such that ∀s ∈ S, ∀i ∈ ρ (s) a ∈A i (s ) σ i (a) = 1, Σ i denotes the set of all behavioral strategies of player i.
The expected utility of player i given a pair of strategies (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is defined as follows:
where p σ (z) denotes the probability that leaf z will be reached if both players follow the strategy from σ and due to stochastic transitions corresponding to C.
A strategy σ i of player i is said to represent a best response to the opponent's strategy
the set of all the pure best responses of player i to strategy σ −i . We can now introduce formally the Stackelberg Equilibrium solution concept:
Definition 2.2 (Stackelberg Equilibrium).
A strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is a Stackelberg Equilibrium if σ 1 is an optimal strategy of the leader given that the follower best-responds to its choice. Formally, a Stackelberg equilibrium in pure strategies is defined as
while a Stackelberg equilibrium in behavioral strategies is defined as
Next, we describe the notion of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the leader can commit to a correlated strategy in a sequential game. The concept was suggested and investigated by Letchford et al. (Letchford et al. 2012 ), but no formal definition exists. Formalizing such a definition here, we observe that the definition is essentially the "Stackelberg analogue" of the notion of Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibria (EFCE) introduced by von Stengel and Forges (2008) . This parallel turns out to be technically relevant as well.
Definition 2.3 (Stackelberg Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium)
. A probability distribution ϕ on pure strategy profiles Π is called a Stackelberg Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium (SEFCE) if it maximizes the leader's utility (that is, ϕ = arg max ϕ ∈Δ(Π) u 1 (ϕ )) subject to the constraint that whenever the play reaches a state s where the follower can act, the follower is recommended an action a according to ϕ such that the follower cannot gain by unilaterally deviating from a in state s (and possibly in all succeeding states), given the posterior on the probability distribution of the strategy of the leader, defined by the actions taken by the leader so far.
The variants of the Stackelberg solution concept with pure and behavioral strategies are guaranteed to exist since we assume that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader (von Stengel and Zamir 2010) . The existence of the correlated variant is guaranteed by the existence of EFCE (von Stengel and Forges 2008) . We give an example to illustrate the variants of the Stackelberg solution concept.
Example 2.4. Consider the game in Figure 1 , where the follower moves first (in states s 1 , s 2 ) and the leader second (in states s 3 , s 4 ). By committing to a behavioral strategy, the leader can gain utility 1 in the optimal case: Leader commits to play left in state s 3 and right in s 4 . The follower will then prefer playing right in s 2 and left in s 1 , reaching the leaf with utilities (1, 3). Note that the leader cannot gain more by committing to strictly mixed behavioral strategies. Now, consider the case when the leader commits to correlated strategies. We interpret the probability distribution over strategy profiles ϕ as signals sent to the follower in each node where the follower acts, whereas the leader is committing to play with respect to ϕ and the signals sent to the follower. This can be shown in node s 2 , where the leader sends one of two signals to the follower, each with probability 0.5. In the first case, the follower receives the signal to move left, while the leader commits to play the uniform strategy in s 3 and action left in s 4 , reaching the utility value (2, 1) if the follower plays according to the signal. In the second case, the follower receives the signal to move right, while the leader commits to play right in s 4 and left in s 3 , reaching the utility value (1, 3) if the follower plays according to the signal. By using this correlation, the leader is Fig. 1. (Left) An example game with different outcomes depending on whether the leader commits to behavioral or to correlated strategies. The leader acts in nodes s 3 and s 4 , the follower acts in nodes s 1 and s 2 . Utility values are shown in the terminal states: First value is the utility for the leader, second value is the utility of the follower. (Right) A visualization of the outcomes of the example game in the two-dimensional utility space of the players: The horizontal axis corresponds to the utility of the follower, the vertical axis corresponds to the utility of the leader. Red vertical lines visualize the minimal value the follower can guarantee in s 2 or s 1 , respectively; blue lines and points correspond to new outcomes that can be achieved if the leader commits to correlated strategies.
able to get the utility of 1.5, while ensuring the utility of 2 for the follower; hence, the follower will follow the only recommendation in node s 1 to play left.
The situation can be visualized using a two-dimensional space, where the x-axis represents the utility of the follower and the y-axis represents the utility of the leader. This type of visualization was also used in Letchford and Conitzer (2010) , and we use it further in the proof of Theorem 3.2. While the black nodes correspond to the utility points of the leafs, the solid black lines correspond to outcomes when the leader randomizes between the leafs. The follower plays a best-response action in each node; hence, in order to force the follower to play action left in s 2 , the leader must guarantee the follower the utility of at least 1 in the subgame rooted in node s 3 since the follower can get at least this value by playing right in s 2 . Therefore, each state of the follower restricts the set of possible outcomes of the game. These restrictions are visualized as the vertical dashed lines: One corresponds to the described situation in node s 2 and the second one due to the leaf following node s 1 . Considering only commitments to behavioral strategies, the best of all possible outcomes for the leader is the point (u 2 = 3, u 1 = 1). With correlation, however, the leader can achieve a mixture of points (u 2 = 1, u 1 = 2) and (u 2 = 3, u 1 = 1) (the blue dashed line). This can also be interpreted as forming a convex hull over all possible outcomes in the subtree rooted in node s 2 . Note, that without correlation, the set of all possible outcomes is not generally a convex set. Finally, after restricting this set of possible solutions due to leaf in node s 1 , the intersection point (u 2 = 2, u 1 = 1.5) represents the expected utility for the Stackelberg Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium solution concept.
The example gives an intuition about the structure of the probability distribution ϕ in SEFCE. In each state of the follower, the leader sends a signal to the follower and commits to follow the correlated strategy if the follower admits the recommendation while simultaneously committing to punish the follower for each deviation. This punishment is simply a strategy that minimizes the follower's utility and will be useful in many proofs; next, we introduce some notation for it.
Let σ m denote a behavioral strategy profile where, in each subgame, the leader plays a minmax behavior strategy based on the utilities of the follower, and the follower plays a best response.
Moreover, for each state s ∈ S, we denote by μ (s) the expected utility of the follower in the subgame rooted in state s if both players play according to σ m (i.e., the value of the corresponding zero-sum subgame defined by the utilities of the follower).
Note that being a probability distribution over pure strategy profiles, a SEFCE is, a priori, an object of exponential size in the size of the description of the game when it is described as a tree. This has to be dealt with before we can consider computing it. The following lemma gives a compact representation of the correlated strategies in a SEFCE, and the proof yields an algorithm for constructing the probability distribution ϕ from the compact representation. It is this compact representation that we seek to compute.
Lemma 2.5. For any turn-based or concurrent-move game in tree form, there exists a SEFCE ϕ ∈ Δ(Π) that can be compactly represented as a behavioral strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) such that ∀z ∈ Z p ϕ (z) = p σ (z) and ϕ corresponds to the following behavior:
• the follower receives signals in each state s according to σ 2 (a) for each action a ∈ A 2 (s)
• the leader chooses the action in each state s according to σ 1 (a) for each action a ∈ A 1 (s) if the state s was reached by following the recommendations • both players switch to the minmax strategy σ m after a deviation by the follower.
Proof. Let ϕ be a SEFCE. We construct the behavioral strategy profile σ from ϕ and then show how an optimal strategy ϕ can be constructed from σ and σ m .
To construct σ , it is sufficient to specify a probability σ (a) for each action a ∈ A(s) in each state s. We use the probability of state s being reached (denoted ϕ (s)) that corresponds to the sum of pure strategy profiles ϕ (π ) such that the actions in strategy profile π allow state s to be reached.
Formally, there exists a sequence s 0 , a 0 , . . . , a k−1 , s k of states and actions (starting at the root), such that for every j = 0, . . . , k − 1 it holds that a j = π (s j ), s j+1 = T (s j , a j ) (or s j+1 is the next decision node of some player if T (s j , a j ) is a chance node), s 0 = s root , and s k = s. Let Π(s) denote a set of pure strategy profiles for which such a sequence exists for state s, and Π(s, a) ⊆ Π(s) the strategy profiles that not only reach s, but also prescribe action a to be played in state s. We have:
In case ϕ (s) = 0, we set the behavior strategy in σ arbitrarily. Next, we construct a strategy ϕ that corresponds to the desired behavior and show that it is indeed an optimal SEFCE strategy. We need to specify a probability for every pure strategy profile π = (π 1 , π 2 ). Consider the sequence of states and actions that corresponds to executing the actions from the strategy profile π . Let
, s k l be one of q possible sequences of states and actions (there can be multiple such sequences due to chance nodes), such that j = 0, . . . ,
is one of the next decision nodes of some player immediately following the chance node(s) T (s l j , a l j )), s l 0 = s root , and s l k l ∈ Z. The probability for the strategy profile π corresponds to the probability of executing the sequences of actions multiplied by the probability that the remaining actions prescribe minmax strategy σ m in case the follower deviates:
Correctness. By construction of σ and ϕ, it holds that probability distribution over leafs remains the same as in ϕ ; hence, ∀z ∈ Z p ϕ (z) = p σ (z) = p ϕ (z) and thus the expected utility of ϕ for the players is the same as in ϕ .
Second, we have to show that the follower has no incentive to deviate from the recommendations in ϕ. By deviating to some action a in state s, the follower gains μ (T (s, a )) since both players play according to σ m after a deviation. In ϕ , the follower can get for the same deviation at best some utility value v 2 (T (s, a )), which by the definition of the minmax strategies σ m is greater than or equal to μ (T (s, a )). Since the expected utility of the follower for following the recommendations is the same in ϕ as in ϕ , and the follower has no incentive to deviate in ϕ because of the optimality, the follower has no incentive to deviate in ϕ either.
COMPUTING EXACT STRATEGIES IN TURN-BASED GAMES
We start our computational investigation with turn-based games. Proof. Our algorithm performs three passes through all the nodes in the graph. First, the algorithm computes the minmax values μ (s) of the follower for each node in the game by backward induction.
Second, the algorithm computes a capacity for each state in order to determine which states of the game are reachable (i.e., there exists a commitment of the leader and a best response of the follower such that the state can be reached by following their strategies). The capacity of state s, denoted γ (s), is defined as the minimum utility of the follower that needs to be guaranteed by the outcome of the subgame starting in state s in order to make this state reachable. We initially set γ (S ∪ Z \ {s root }) = ∞ and mark them as open, while we set γ (s root ) = −∞ and mark the root state as closed.
Next, the algorithm evaluates each open state s, for which all parents have been marked as closed. We distinguish whether the leader or the follower makes the decision:
• s is a leader node: The algorithm sets γ (s ) = min(γ (s ), γ (s)) for all children s ∈ T (s);
• s is a follower node: The algorithm sets
for all children s ∈ T (s).
Finally, we mark state s as closed. We say that leaf z ∈ Z is a possible outcome, if μ (z) = u 2 (z) ≥ γ (z). Now, the solution is such a possible outcome that maximizes the utility of the leader; that is, arg max z ∈Z u 2 (z) ≥γ (z ) u 1 (z). The strategy is now constructed in the third pass by following nodes from leaf z back to the root while using nodes s with capacities γ (s ) ≤ μ (z). Due to the construction of capacities, such a path exists and forms a part of the Stackelberg strategy. The leader commits to the strategy leading to max min utility for the follower in the remaining states that are not part of this path.
Correctness. To show the correctness of the algorithm, we must show that capacities for each node are correctly computed in the second pass. Whenever the algorithm evaluates a state s, the capacities of its parents are final; hence, the capacity value γ (s) is also determined and final. Next, since the graph is a finite DAG, at least one vertex is marked as closed in each iteration, and therefore the second phase terminates and each vertex is evaluated exactly once.
A capacity for state s is defined as the minimum utility of the follower that needs to be guaranteed by the outcome of the subgame starting in state s. Recall that all nodes have the initial capacity set to ∞. Now, the capacities are updated iteratively. If a state s can be immediately reached from a leader's node s, the capacity of s can be decreased only if γ (s) < γ (s ) : Since node s can be reached while guaranteeing the value of γ (s) for the follower, the leader can then just commit to play the action that leads to s . If a state s can be immediately reached from a follower's node s, the capacity of s can be decreased due to other choices in s: The action that leads from s to s must be a best response for the follower; hence, the follower must be guaranteed the best utility she can get by deviating in s, which is ensured by the computation of capacities. As a direct consequence of the construction of capacities, for each node s there exists a pure strategy of the leader π 1 that she can commit to and a best response π 2 ∈ BR 2 (π 1 ) of the follower such that node s is reached when players follow these strategies. Now, selecting the leaf with the maximum utility for the leader among all possible outcomes is a direct application of the definition of Stackelberg equilibria.
Complexity Analysis. Computing the max min values can be done in O (|S|(|S| + |Z|)) by backward induction due to the fact the graph is a DAG. In the second pass, the algorithm solves the widest-path problem from a single source to all leafs. In each node, the algorithm calculates capacities for every child. In nodes where the leader acts, there is a constant-time operation performed for each child. However, we need to be more careful in nodes where the follower acts. For each child s ∈ T (s), the algorithm computes a maximum value μ (s ) of all of the siblings. We can do this efficiently by computing two maximal values of μ (s ) for all s ∈ T (s) (say s 1 , s 2 ), and for each child then the term max s ∈T (s )\{s } μ (s ) equals either to s 1 if s s 1 , or to s 2 if s = s 1 . Therefore, the second pass can again be done in O (|S|(|S| + |Z|)). Finally, finding the optimal outcome and constructing the optimal strategy is again at most linear in the size of the graph. Therefore, the algorithm takes at most O (|S|(|S| + |Z|)) steps.
Next, we provide an algorithm for computing a Stackelberg extensive-form correlated equilibrium for turn-based games with no chance nodes.
Theorem 3.2. There is an algorithm that takes as input a turn-based game in tree form with no chance nodes and outputs an SEFCE in the compact representation. The algorithm runs in time O (|S||Z|).
Proof. We improve the algorithm from the proof of Theorem 4 in Letchford and Conitzer (2010) . The algorithm contains two steps: (i) a bottom-up dynamic program that for each node s computes the set of possible outcomes, and (ii) a downward pass constructing the optimal correlated strategy in the compact representation.
For each node s we keep set of points H s in two-dimensional space, where the x-dimension represents the utility of the follower and the y-dimension represents the utility of the leader. These points define the convex set of all possible outcomes of the subgame rooted in node s (we assume that H s contains only the points on the boundary of the convex hull). We keep each set H s sorted by polar angle.
Upward pass. In leaf z ∈ Z, we set H z = {z}. In nodes s, where the leader acts, the set of points H s is equal to the convex hull of the corresponding sets of the children H w . That is,
In nodes s, where the follower acts, the algorithm performs two steps. First, the algorithm removes from each set H w of child w the outcomes from which the follower has an incentive to deviate. To do this, the algorithm uses the maxmin u 2 values of all other children of s except w and creates a new setĤ w that we call the restricted set. The restricted setĤ w is defined as an intersection of the convex set representing all possible outcomes H w and all outcomes defined by the halfspace restricting the utility x of the follower by the inequality: Second, the algorithm computes the set H s by creating a convex hull of the corresponding restricted setsĤ w of the children w. That is, H s = Conv(∪ w ∈T (s )Ĥw ).
Finally, in the root of the game tree, the outcome of the SEFCE is the point with maximal payoff of player 1: p S E = arg max p ∈H s r oot u 1 (p).
Downward pass.
We now construct the compact representation of commitment to correlated strategies that ensures the outcome p S E calculated in the upward pass. The method for determining the optimal strategy in each node is similar to the method strategy(s, p ) used in the proof of Theorem 4 in Letchford and Conitzer (2010) . Given a node s and a point p that lies on the boundary of H s , this method specifies how to commit to correlated strategies in the subtree rooted in node s. Moreover, the proof in Letchford and Conitzer (2010) also showed that it is sufficient to consider mixtures of at most two actions in each node, and allowing correlated strategies does violate their proof. We consider separately leader and follower nodes:
• For each node s, where the leader acts, the algorithm needs to find two points p, p in the boundaries of children H w and H w , such that the desired point p is a convex combination of p ∈ H w and p ∈ H w . If w = w , then the strategy in node s is to commit to pure strategy leading to node w. If w w , then the strategy to commit to in node s is a mixture: with probability α to play action leading to w and with probability (1 − α ) to play action leading to w , where α ∈ [0, 1] is such that p = αp + (1 − α )p . Finally, for every child s ∈ T (s) we call the method strategy with appropriate p (or p ) in case s = w (or w ), and with the threat value corresponding to μ (s ) for every other child.
• For each node s where the follower acts, the algorithm again needs to find two points p, p in the restricted boundaries of childrenĤ w andĤ w , such that the desired point p is a convex combination of p ∈Ĥ w and p ∈Ĥ w . The reason for using the restricted sets is because the follower must not have an incentive to deviate from the recommendation. Similarly to the previous case, if w = w , then the correlated strategy in node s is to send the follower signal leading to node w while committing further to play strategy(w, p) in the subtree rooted in node w, and to play the minmax strategy in every other child s corresponding to value μ (s ).
If w w , then there is a mixture of possible signals: With probability α, the follower receives a signal to play the action leading to w, and, with probability (1 − α ), a signal to play the action leading to w , where α ∈ [0, 1] is again such that p = αp + (1 − α )p . As before, by sending the signal to play a certain action, the leader commits to play method strategy(w, p) (or strategy(w , p )) in the subtree rooted in node w (or w ) and commits to play the minmax strategy leading to value μ (s ) for every other child s .
Correctness. Due to the construction of the set of points H s that are maintained for each node s, these points correspond to the convex hull of all possible outcomes in the subgame rooted in node s. In leafs, the algorithm adds the point corresponding to the leaf. In the leader's nodes, the algorithm creates a convex combination of all possible outcomes in the children of the node. The only places where the algorithm removes some outcomes from these sets are nodes of the follower. If a point is removed from H w in node s, there exists an action of the follower in s that guarantees the follower a strictly better expected payoff than the expected payoff of the outcome that correspond to the removed point. Therefore, such an outcome is not possible as the follower will have an incentive to deviate. The outcome selected in the root node is the possible outcome that maximizes the payoff of the leader on all possible outcomes; hence, it is optimal for the leader. Finally, the downward pass constructs the compact representation of the optimal correlated strategy to commit to that reaches the optimal outcome.
Complexity Analysis.
Computing the boundary of the convex hull H s takes O (|Z|) time in each level of the game tree since the children sets H w are already sorted (De Berg et al. 2000, p. 6) . Moreover, since we keep only nodes on the boundary of the convex hull, the inequality s ∈S |H s | ≤ |Z| for all nodes in a single level of the game tree also bounds the number of lines that need to be checked in the downward pass. Therefore, each pass takes at most O (|S||Z|) time. Interestingly, the algorithm described in the proof of Theorem 3.2 can be modified also in cases where the game contains chance, as shown in the next theorem. This is in contrast to computing a Stackelberg equilibria that is NP-hard with chance.
Theorem 3.3. There is an algorithm that takes as input a turn-based game in tree form with chance nodes and outputs the compact form of an SEFCE for the game. The algorithm runs in time O (|S||Z|).
Proof. We can use the proof from Theorem 3.2, but we need to analyze what happens in chance nodes in the upward pass. The algorithm computes in chance nodes the Minkowski sum of all convex sets in child nodes, and, since all sets are sorted and this is a planar case, this operation can be again performed in linear time (De Berg et al. 2000, p. 279 ). The size of set H s is again bounded by the number of all leafs (Gritzmann and Sturmfels 1993) .
COMPUTING EXACT STRATEGIES IN CONCURRENT-MOVE GAMES
Next, we analyze concurrent-move games and show that while the problem of computing a Stackelberg equilibrium in behavior strategies is NP-hard (even without chance nodes), the problem of computing an SEFCE can be solved in polynomial time.
Theorem 4.1. Given a concurrent-move game in tree form with no chance nodes and a number α, it is NP-hard to decide if the leader achieves payoff at least α in a Stackelberg equilibrium in behavior strategies.
The proof for the preceding hardness result is included in Appendix A.1; the proof uses a reduction from the NP-complete problem Knapsack and constructs a two-step concurrent-move game. Note that computing a Stackelberg equilibrium in a single-shot concurrent-move game is polynomial (Conitzer and Sandholm 2006) .
Theorem 4.2. For a concurrent-move games in tree form, the compact form of an SEFCE for the game can be found in polynomial time by solving a single linear program.

Proof. We construct a linear program (LP) based on the LP for computing EFCE (von Stengel and Forges 2008).
We use the compact representation of SEFCE strategies (described by Lemma 2.5) represented by variables δ (s) that denote a joint probability that state s is reached when both players, and chance, play according to SEFCE strategies.
The size of the original EFCE LP-both the number of variables and constraints-is quadratic in the number of sequences of players. However, the LP for EFCE is defined for a more general class of imperfect-information games without chance. In our case, we can exploit the specific structure of a concurrent-move game and, together with the Stackelberg assumption, reduce the number of constraints and variables.
First, the deviation from a recommended strategy causes the game to reach a different subgame in which the strategy of the leader can be chosen (almost) independently of the subgame that follows the recommendation. Second, the strategy that the leader should play according to the deviations is a minmax strategy, with which the leader punishes the follower by minimizing the utility of the follower as much as possible. Thus, by deviating to action a in state s, the follower can get at best the minmax value of the subgame starting in node T (s, a ) that we denote as μ (T (s, a ) ). The values μ (s) for each state s ∈ S can be computed beforehand using backward induction.
The linear program is:
subject to:
The interpretation is as follows. Variables δ represent the compact form of the correlated strategies. Equation (2) ensures that the probability of reaching the root state is 1, while Equation (3) ensures that for each state s, we have δ (s) between 0 and 1.
Network-flow constraints:
The probability of reaching a state equals the sum of probabilities of reaching all possible children (Equation (4)), and it must correspond with the probability of actions in chance nodes (Equation (5)). The objective function ensures that the LP finds a correlated strategy that maximizes the leader's utility.
The follower has no incentive to deviate from the recommendations given by δ : To this end, variables v 2 (s) represent the expected payoff for the follower in a subgame rooted in node s ∈ S when played according to δ , defined by Equations (6-7). Each action that is recommended by δ must guarantee the follower at least the utility she gets by deviating from the recommendation. This is ensured by Equation (8), where the expected utility for recommended action a 2 is expressed by the left side of the constraint, while the expected utility for deviating is expressed by the right side of the constraint.
Note that the expected utility on the right-hand side of Equation (8) is calculated by considering the posterior probability after receiving the recommendation a 2 and the minmax values of children states after playing a 2 ; μ (T (s, a 1 × a 2 )).
Therefore, the variables δ found by solving this linear program correspond to the compact representation of the optimal SEFCE strategy.
APPROXIMATING OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
In this section, we describe fully polynomial-time approximation schemes for finding a Stackelberg equilibrium in behavioral strategies as well as in pure strategies for turn-based games on trees with chance nodes. The notion of approximation we consider is additive approximation, and, for this to make sense, we assume that the utility function of the leader is bounded to the range [0, 1].
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We start with the problem of computing behavioral strategies for turn-based games on trees with chance nodes. The exact version of this problem was shown to be NP-hard by Letchford and Conitzer (2010) . Their hardness proof was a reduction from Knapsack and our algorithm is closely related to the classical approximation scheme for this problem. We present here the algorithm and delegate the proof of correctness to the appendix.
Our scheme uses dynamic programming to construct a table of values for each node in the tree. Each table contains a discretized representation of the possible tradeoffs between the utility that the leader can get and the utility that can, at the same time, be offered to the follower. In the appendix, we show that the cumulative error in the leader's utility is bounded additively by the height of the tree. This error only depends on the height of the tree and not the utility. By an initial scaling of the leader utility by a factor D, this error can be made arbitrarily small, at the cost of extra computation time. The scaling is equivalent to discretizing the leader's payoff to multiples of some small δ = 1/D. For simplicity, we only describe the scheme for binary trees, since nodes with higher branching factors can be replaced by small equivalent binary trees.
An important property is that only the leader's utility is discretized, since we need to be able to reason correctly about the follower's actions. The tables are indexed by the leader's utility and contain values that are the follower's utility.
We first present the dynamic programming algorithm as a separate statement. 
Last, the algorithm runs in time O (TU 3 ), where T is the size of the game and U = U 2 − U 1 .
(sketch). We will now examine each type of node and, for each, show how the table is constructed. For each node T , we let L and R denote the two successors (if any), and we let A T , A L , and A R denote their respective tables. Each table will have U + 2 entries, indexed by k ∈ {U 1 , . . . ,U 2 + 1}.
Leaf nodes.
If T is a leaf with utility (u 1 , u 2 ), the table can be filled directly from the definition:
Leader nodes. If T is a leader node, and the leader plays L with probability p followed up by the strategies that gave the guarantees for A L [i] and A R [j] , then the leader would get at least an expected pi + (1 − p)j while being able to offer pA L [i] + (1 − p)A R [j] to the follower. For a given k, the optimal combination of the computed tradeoffs becomes:
This table can be computed in time O (U 3 ) by looping over all i, j, k, and taking the maximum with the extremal feasible values of p.
Chance nodes. If T is a chance node, where the probability of L is p, and the leader combines the strategies that gave the guarantees for A L [i] and A R [j] , then the leader would get at least an expected pi + (1 − p)j while being able to offer pA L [i] + (1 − p)A R [j] to the follower. For a given k, the optimal combination of the computed tradeoffs becomes: 
. Thus, the optimal combination becomes
The table A T can be filled in time O (U ).
Putting it all together, each table can be computed in time O (U 3 ), and there is one table for each node in the tree, which gives the desired running time.
With this in place, the approximation algorithm is immediate.
(Theorem 5.1). Let G be the given game and let u Opt be the leader utility in a Stackelberg equilibrium in G. Let G be obtained from G by scaling all leader utilities by a factor (H T + 1)/ϵ (we do not round to integer utilities; this is already done implicitly by the dynamic programming algorithm).
Next, apply the algorithm of Proposition 5.2 to G . Let A T be the table of the root node, let k = max{i | A T [i] > −∞}, and let σ 1 be the associated leader strategy given by property (1). Note that k is well-defined, since A T [0] > −∞ by property (3). By property (2), we have that
Thus, σ 1 approximates the leader payoff of a Stackelberg equilibrium with additive error H T + 1 in G , which means the additive error in the original game G is (
Next, we state the analogous statement for the case of pure strategies. Again, the exact problem was shown to be NP-hard by Conitzer and Letchford. 
Last, the algorithm runs in time O (TU 2 ), where T is the size of the game and U = U 2 − U 1 .
(sketch). The algorithm is essentially the same as the one for behavioral strategies, except that leader nodes only have p ∈ {0, 1}. For a given k, the optimal combination of the computed tradeoffs becomes:
The table A T can thus be computed in time O (U ).
Since now the leader nodes can now be handled in linear time, the chance nodes are now the limiting case, and each table can thus be computed in time O (U 2 ), giving the desired total running time O (TU 2 ).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our article settles several open questions in the problem of complexity of computing a Stackelberg equilibrium in finite sequential games. Very often, the problem is NP-hard for many subclasses of extensive-form games, and we show that the hardness holds also for games in the tree form with concurrent moves. However, there are important subclasses that admit either an efficient polynomial algorithm or fully polynomial-time approximation schemes (FPTAS); we provide an FPTAS for games on trees with chance. The question unanswered within the scope of this article is whether there exists a (fully) polynomial-time approximation scheme for games in the tree form with concurrent moves. Our conjecture is that the answer is negative.
Second, we formalize a Stackelberg variant of the Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium solution concept (SEFCE) where the leader commits to correlated strategies. We show that the complexity of the problem is often reduced (to polynomial) compared to NP-hardness when the leader commits to behavioral strategies.
Our article does not address many other variants of computing a Stackelberg equilibrium where the leader commits to correlated strategies. First, we consider only two-player games with one leader and one follower. Even though computing an EFCE in games with multiple players is solvable in polynomial time, a recent result showed that computing a SEFCE on trees with no chance with three or more players is NP-hard (Černý 2016) . Second, we consider only behavioral strategies (or memoryless strategies) in games on DAGs. Extending the concept of SEFCE to strategies that can use some fixed-size memory is a natural continuation of the present work.
A APPENDIX
In this section, we provide all the missing proofs.
A.1 Computing Exact Strategies in Concurrent-Move Games
For the analysis in this section, we use a variant of the NP-complete problem Knapsack, which we call Knapsack with unit-items: The following lemma will be useful. We can now prove the main result of this section. Proof. Consider an instance of Knapsack with unit-items. We define a concurrent-move extensive-form game in a way so that the optimal utility attainable by the leader is equal to the optimal solution value of the Knapsack with unit-items instance.
The game tree consists of two levels (see Figure 2) : the root node consisting of N actions of the leader and N + 1 actions of the follower. M denotes a large constant that we use to force the leader to select a uniform strategy in the root node. More precisely, we choose M as the smallest integer such that M > W Nv i and M > Nw i for i = 1, . . . , N . In the second level, there is a state I i corresponding to item i that models the decision of the leader to include items in the subset (action ⊕) or not (action ).
Consider a feasible solution J to the Knapsack with unit-items problem with unit-items. This translates into a strategy for the leader as follows. In the root node, she plays the uniform strategy and, in the subgame I i plays ⊕ with probability 1 if i ∈ J and plays with probability 1 otherwise. We can now observe that the follower plays L in subgames I i where i ∈ J , since ties are broken in favor of the leader, and the follower plays R in subgames I i where i J . In the root node, action f 0 for the follower thus leads to payoff
Since ties are broken in favor of the leader, the follower plays action f 0 , which means that the leader receives payoff i ∈J v i , which is the value of the Knapsack with unit-items solution. Consider, on the other hand, an optimal strategy for the leader. By the structure of the game, we have the following lemma: Claim 1. Without loss of generality, the leader plays using a pure strategy in each subgame I i .
Proof. If in subgame I the leader commits to playing ⊕ with probability 1, the follower will choose to play L due to ties being broken in favor of the leader. If, on the other hand, the leader plays ⊕ with probability strictly lower than 1, the follower will choose to play R, leading to utility 0 for the leader and at most 0 for the follower. Since the leader can only obtain positive utility if the follower plays action f 0 in the root node, there is thus no benefit for the leader in decreasing the utility for the follower by committing to a strictly mixed strategy. In other words, if the leader plays ⊕ with probability strictly lower than 1, the leader might as well play ⊕ with probability 0.
Thus, from now on, we assume that the leader plays using a pure strategy in each sub-game I i . Let J ∈ P(N ) be such that the set of indices i of the subgames I i where the leader commits to action ⊕. If the follower plays action f k , for k ≥ 1, the leader obtains payoff 0 and the follower obtains payoff
Let k be such that ε k = max i ε i and assume to the contrary that ε k > 0. Note that
We now proceed by case analysis.
. By definition of ε k and M we have
Multiplying both sides of the inequality by N and using the inequality: −W ≥ − i ∈J w i , we have
which means that action f k is preferred by the follower. Thus, the leader receives payoff 0.
Case 2 ( i ∈J w i < W ). Since we have a Knapsack with unit-items instance, there is a knapsack solution that obtains value 1 + i ∈J v i , which corresponds to a strategy for the leader that obtains the same utility. Since the current strategy is optimal for the leader, we must
Thus, the payoff for the follower is strictly positive for the action f k , and this is thus preferred to f 0 , thus leading to payoff 0 to the leader.
Since there is a strategy for the leader that obtains strictly positive payoff, we can thus assume that the strategy for the leader chooses an action uniformly at random in the root node, and the follower chooses action f 0 . Since f 0 is preferred by the follower to any other action, this means that i ∈J w i ≤ W , and the leader obtains payoff i ∈J v i . Thus, this corresponds exactly to a feasible solution to the Knapsack with unit-items instance of the same value.
B APPROXIMATING OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
In this section, we provide the full analysis for the dynamic programming algorithms used for our approximation algorithm. 
Proposition 5.2 (Restated). There is an algorithm that takes as input a turn-based game on a tree with chance nodes and leader utilities in the range
We have provided the algorithm in the main body of this article; its correctness and running time will follow from the next lemma.
Lemma B.1. The algorithm of Proposition 5.2 is correct and has the desired running time.
Proof. We will prove the properties hold for the computed tables by induction. These properties also form our induction hypothesis. In the proof , we will for convenience index the tables with k also outside the range {U 1 , . . . ,U 2 + 1}, noting that the tables would have
We consider each type of node in the tree. The easy case is the case of leaf nodes, where the properties hold trivially by construction.
Leader nodes. Let T be a leader node, with successors L and R, each with tables A L and A R . If the leader plays L with probability p and plays R with the remaining probability (1 − p), followed up by the strategies that gave the guarantees for A L [i] and A R [j] , then the leader would get at least an expected pi + (1 − p)j, while being able to offer pA L [i] + (1 − p)A R [j] to the follower. For a given k, the optimal combination of the computed tradeoffs becomes:
For property (1) of the induction hypothesis, the strategy that guarantees A T [k] simply combines the strategies for the maximizing A L [i] and A R [j] along with the probability p at nodeT . For a given i, j, and k, finding the optimal value p amounts to maximizing a linear function over an interval (i.e., it will attain its maximum at one of the end points of the interval). The table A T can thus be filled in time O (U 3 ) by looping over all i, j, k.
For property (2) of the induction hypothesis, assume for contradiction that some strategy σ yields utilities (u σ 1 , u σ 2 ) with u
Let p σ be the probability that σ assigns to the action L, and let (u
2 ) be the utilities from playing σ and the corresponding follower strategy in the left and right child, respectively. By definition,
By the induction hypothesis,
Thus,
But Chance nodes. Let T be a chance node, with successors L and R, each with tables A L and A R , and let p be the probability that chance picks L. If the leader combines the strategies that gave the guarantees for A L [i] and A R [j] , then the leader would get at least an expected pi + (1 − p)j while being able to offer pA
to the follower. For a given k, the optimal combination of the computed tradeoffs becomes: For property (2) of the induction hypothesis, assume for contradiction that some strategy σ yields utilities (u σ 1 , u σ 2 ) with u Let (u
By the induction hypothesis, 
Thus, Finally, for property (2) of the induction hypothesis, let H T be the height of the tree T . Suppose that some strategy σ yields (u σ 1 , u σ 2 ) with u
Assume without loss of generality that the follower plays L. Let (u
2 ) be the utilities from playing σ and the corresponding follower strategy in the left child. Combined with the induction hypothesis, we get
But this is a contradiction, since A T [k] is nonincreasing in k and
This completes the proof.
For the case of commitment to pure strategies, we had a very similar algorithm. In essence, the algorithm for Theorem 5.3 is the same, except leader nodes only consider p ∈ {0, 1}. The induction hypothesis is the same, except the quantifications are over pure strategies instead. We argue the correctness of this algorithm formally in the following lemma. For property (2) of the induction hypothesis, assume for contradiction that some pure strategy π yields utilities (u π 1 , u π 2 ) with u
Assume without loss of generality that π plays L at T , and let (u
2 ) be the utilities from playing π and the corresponding follower strategy in L. By definition,
By the induction hypothesis, u
But u π, L 1
meaning that i = u π, L 1 − H T + 1 satisfies the constraints in the definition of A T [k], which contradicts the assumption that u π 2 > A T [k] .
